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ABSTRACT
The US Food and drug Administration (FDA) is estimated to regulate markets accounting for about
20% of consumer spending in the US. This paper proposes a general methodology to evaluate FDA
policies, in general, and the central speed-safety tradeoff it faces, in particular. We apply this
methodology to estimate the welfare effects of a major piece of legislation affecting this tradeoff,
the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFA). We find that PDUFA raised the private surplus of
producers, and thus innovative returns, by about $11 to $13 billion. Dependent on the market power
assumed of producers while having patent protection, we find that PDUFA raised consumer welfare
between $5 to$19 billion; thus the combined social surplus was raised between $18 to $31 billions.
Converting these economic gains into equivalent health benefits, we find that the more rapid access
of drugs on the market enabled by PDUFA saved the equivalent of 180 to 310 thousand life-years.
Additionally, we estimate an upper bound on the adverse effects of PDUFA based on drugs
submitted during PDUFA I/II and subsequently withdrawn for safety reasons, and find that an
extreme upper bound of about 56 thousand life-years were lost. We discuss how our general
methodology  could  be  used  to  perform  a  quantitative  and  evidence-based  evaluation  of  the
desirability of other FDA policies in the future, particularly those affecting the speed-safety tradeoff.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
  In virtually all developed countries, regulatory authorities provide public oversight of the 
safety and efficacy of prescription drugs, prior to their being approved for marketing.  In the 
U.S., such oversight is conducted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  A central 
tradeoff facing the FDA, and argued by many to be the most central one, involves balancing two 
goals – fulfilling its mission set by Congress to assure the safety and efficacy of drugs, while at 
the same time advancing the public health by not slowing down or disabling the innovative 
process by which new medical products reach the market.   
  Critics of the FDA, domestic and foreign, appear on both sides of this tradeoff.  Some 
observers have argued that the FDA is not taking enough time evaluating new drugs, thereby 
allowing unsafe drugs to be marketed, while others have argued that the agency is taking too 
long in doing so and therefore inflicting harmful effects on innovative returns and patient 
welfare.
1 However, surprisingly, very little quantitative empirical evidence has been put forward 
to evaluate the degree to which the speed and safety tradeoff facing the FDA is being resolved 
efficiently.  More generally, there seems to be no suggested quantitative methodology or 
framework for assessing the economic efficiency of the central speed-safety tradeoff of the 
agency.
2  This is somewhat paradoxical, since despite the agency’s strict adherence to evidence-
based evaluation of products overseen, there is less evidence on its own safety and efficacy.  Put 
differently, no product application would pass the FDA approval process with the quality and 
type of evidence that currently exists for evaluating the FDA policies themselves.  The welfare 
consequences of this lack of methodology and systematic evidence may be quite substantial, as     4 
the FDA is estimated to regulate markets accounting for about 20% of consumer spending in the 
US.      
   Motivated by this lack of quantitative assessment of FDA policies, this paper proposes a 
general methodology to evaluate the common speed-safety tradeoff of FDA regulations. The 
methodology only relies on the most common form of data available surrounding the drug 
approval process, namely, the distribution of approval and withdrawal times of drugs as well as 
the distribution of sales of the approved drugs. We use these commonly available data to 
estimate the social value of a drug.  As indicated in Figure 1, in this paper we interpret the 
overall social value of a drug as its yearly social welfare from the time of review and approval to 
the time of withdrawal, if the drug is withdrawn.  
As shown in Figure 1, the annual social surplus occurs after the drug is reviewed and 
approved, then split up into consumer and producer surplus components while on the market, and 
vanishes completely once the drug is withdrawn (if ever). Therefore, if the drug is beneficial as it 
is in the figure, its overall social value falls with the review time and rises with the time until 
withdrawal. However, if the drug is harmful, as when the social surplus is negative and below 
the x-axis in the figure, then its overall social value rises with the review time and falls with the 
time until withdrawal. The agency in general, and separate regulations in particular, influence 
aggregate social welfare by affecting the distribution of review and withdrawal times, as well as 
the magnitude and signs of the post-approval annual flows of social surplus. 
We apply this framework to quantify the change in aggregate social welfare induced by 
major legislative acts comprised of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992, later 
continued as PDUFA-II in 1997 and PUDFA-III in 2002.  These legislative acts specified 
performance goals for the FDA in terms of faster review times, while levying taxes in the form     5 
of user fees on the sponsoring applicant for consideration of new and supplemental drug 
applications, as well as for existing manufacturing establishments and products. The user fee 
revenues obtained under PDUFA represent a substantial portion of the FDA’s total revenues 
obligated to processing human drug applications, often estimated to be close to half of the 
funding of the drug review process.
3   The implementation of PDUFA and its impact on the 
central speed-safety tradeoff of the agency can be envisaged in Figure 1; faster review of drugs 
involves a shift to the left of the surplus curve in Figure 1, which is accomplished with the 
additional resources generated from the user-fees, but with the potential consequence of less 
attention being devoted to the safety of the drugs approved, entailing a downward shift in the 
surplus curve of Figure1 together with a reduction in withdrawal times.   
To estimate the impact of PDUFA on aggregate social welfare, we first assess the impact 
of these Acts on review times using 662 New Molecular Entity (NME) drug approvals in the 
years 1979-2002 prior to and following enactment of the Acts in 1992.  We find that even though 
there was a decline in review times of 2 percent a year prior to PDUFA, passage and 
implementation of PDUFA I and II accelerated the decline by 6-7% and 3-4% a year 
respectively. Using the estimated effects of PDUFA on approval times for each of the drug 
approvals, we are then able to estimate the counterfactual approval time that would have 
occurred in the absence of PDUFA.  
The estimated effects in review times induced by PDUFA are first used to assess the 
impact on producer surplus or variable profits. One of the main issues of the speed-safety 
tradeoff facing the FDA is how PDUFA affects innovative returns. The revenues of a drug under 
PDUFA are derived from actual sales data, and the counterfactual revenues come from delaying 
the entry of the drug by the predicted drug-specific delay between the observed and     6 
counterfactual review times in a world with and without PDUFA.  To estimate the effect of 
PDUFA on the innovative return of the drug, we then net out from the earlier arrival of its sales 
the application, product, and establishment fees associated with the drug under PDUFA as well 
as variable costs estimated by price levels before patents have run out and extensive entry of 
generic drugs has occurred.  Our main finding is that producer surplus rose with the introduction 
of PDUFA by about $11 billion or 1.2 percent (at a real discount rate of 3% and measured in 
1992 dollars at the inception of PDUFA).  For the sample of 284 drugs for which we had sales 
information during PDUFA I and PDUFA II, this represents a gain of about $39 million per drug 
launched.   
  We then consider estimation of  the social surplus from the additional speed induced by 
PDUFA through adding estimates of consumer surplus to the estimated producer surplus levels. 
We focus our discussion on two ways of adding consumer surplus to compute the social benefits 
of PDUFA. The first case occurs when full price discrimination is infeasible so that some 
consumer surplus exists under the patent.  We use as a benchmark the case when consumer 
surplus is half of producer surplus, as turns out to be true when demand is linear and there are 
constant returns to scale.  Also, under no price discrimination, we derive the simple but plausible 
conditions under which measures of sales, the most commonly available data on drug usage, 
constitute a lower bound to the social surplus.  The second case occurs when price discrimination 
is complete so that there is no consumer surplus during the patent period but only after generics 
have entered. In this case, sales during the patent period represent producer surplus, and sales 
just prior to expiration represent the consumer surplus after the patent has expired.  Our major 
findings here are that under no price discrimination, the social surplus generated by the greater 
speed of PDUFA is $31 billion or 1.2 percent under demand linearity and constant returns to     7 
scale, but bounded below by $21 billion or 1.2 percent under less stringent demand and cost 
assumptions.  For the case of complete price discrimination, we find that the benefit of the 
additional speed is $18 billion or 1.2 percent.  For the 284 drugs with sales data, these estimates 
amount to a gain of about $109 or $62 million per drug introduced since the inception of 
PDUFA. 
  These evaluations of the social benefits of speed are then compared to the social costs of 
a possibly less safe approval process. To assess the impact on consumer safety, we first consider 
the effect PDUFA had on the fraction of drugs withdrawn and how rapidly they were withdrawn. 
However, these measures of the quantity and timing of withdrawal do not fully capture the 
quality of the drugs withdrawn. We also compute how much harm to health PDUFA must have 
imposed in order to offset the gains from speed due to more rapid review. Our major findings are 
that the proportion and timing of withdrawal of drugs approved pre- and post-PDUFA do not 
differ in a statistically significant way; about 2-3% of approved drugs are withdrawn at the same 
speed before and after the Acts. In addition, we compute an extreme upper bound on the adverse 
safety effects induced by PDUFA by assuming that all NME withdrawals after 1992 were due to 
PDUFA and that the were no benefits associated with the drugs so that their social surplus is 
measured by the harmful health effects the withdrawn drugs imposed.  Using this extreme upper 
bound on the adverse safety effects of PDUFA, we find that the drugs approved and withdrawn 
during PDUFA cost  about 56 thousand life years as compared to the gains in health implicit in 
the greater speed generated by PDUFA,  which are estimated at the equivalent of 180 to 310 
thousand life years. This estimate comes from dividing the value induced by speed for the 
different social surplus cases by a range of estimates for the value of a life year, between 
$100,000 to $300,000.      8 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II we provide a general framework for 
assessing quantitatively the value of changes to the speed-safety tradeoff facing the FDA.  In 
Section III we provide a brief overview of PDUFA-I and PDUFA-II.   In Sections IV and V, we 
discuss estimation of the beneficial speed effects of PDUFA on producer, consumer, and social 
welfare, using methods of bounding social surplus from sales data.  In Section VI we estimate 
negative safety effects of PDUFA by considering their effects on drug withdrawals as well as 
calculating the equivalent losses in social surplus or health that must be induced to offset the 
observed benefits of speed.  Finally, in Section VII we summarize our findings, note limitations 
of our research, and suggest directions for further research.     
 
II.  A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CHANGES IN THE SPEED-SAFETY 
TRADEOFF OF THE FDA 
 
This section discusses a parsimonious framework for evaluating changes in FDA policy 
that affect the speed-safety tradeoff.  Let p(y) denote the inverse demand curve for a drug in a 
given year and let c(y) be the cost function where y represents output.  The annual producer ￿(y) 
and consumer surplus s(y) are specified in a standard manner as  
  ￿(y) = p(y)y – c(y) and                                              
  s(y) = ￿
y
0 [p(q) – p(y)]dq.                                         
This specification could be modified to other forms of non-canonical producer and consumer 
surplus  relationships,  e.g.,  representing  insurance  coverage  of  consumers  or  asymmetric 
information about risks between consumers and producers.  Regardless of how surpluses are 
specified, we denote by w a vector of annual surpluses where each element wt=st+￿t is the annual 
social surplus t years after the drug is first marketed. We assume throughout that either w￿0 or 
w￿0, that is, the drug is either always valued or not for all periods. Given these annual social     9 
surplus levels, a drug that is approved at date a and is on the market for a duration of m periods, 
has the realized social welfare  

















 ￿tdt = S + ￿. 
 
This realized surplus implies that if a drug has social value every period, w > 0, the 
overall welfare falls in the approval time and rises in the time on market; i.e., dW/da < 0 and 
dW/dm >0.  In other words, speeding up the entry of a valuable drug or postponing its exit both 
raise social surplus.  On the other hand, if the drug is socially harmful every period, w < 0, the 
welfare rises in the approval time and falls in the market time, i.e., dW/da > 0 and dW/dm <0.  In 
other words, delaying a harmful drug or shortening its time on the market both raise social 
welfare.  Note here that non-approval and non-withdrawal of a drug can be represented by 
infinite values of a, for which W is zero as no surplus is realized,  and m, in which case we 
assume the annual surplus  eventually decreases with time due to therapeutic and generic 
competition, making the welfare well defined.  
Given that drugs are patent protected, the social surplus, and its share attributable to 
consumers versus producers, may differ across years since the drug has been marketed.  In 
particular, the social surplus wt = st + ￿t for the t
th year the drug is on the market depends on the 
length of the patent ￿. Given a patent length, the producer surplus mainly obtains from the profits 
while on patent, when t ￿￿. Indeed, we will assume that the present value of profits after patent 
expiration at the time of launch is zero not only due to generic competition but also due to 
discounting.  As opposed to the case for producer surplus, the annual consumer surplus is lower 
during the patent period and occurs mainly after the patent has expired, when t ￿ ￿, as producer 
surplus is then substituted for consumer surplus.       10 
For a total of N applications with the distribution F(a,m,s,￿) of approval times, market 
times, and surplus levels, the aggregate social welfare, A, can be broken down into a consumer 
and producer component as follows: 
  A=N￿WdF =N￿SdF + N￿￿dF. 
Now consider the impact of the FDA on the aggregate social welfare A.  Assume that the 
drugs considered under the FDA are represented by (N,F) and the drugs without the FDA are 
represented by (No,Fo).  It seems warranted to assume that a drug would be marketed faster 
without the FDA, ao ￿a,  that it would remain on the market longer without the FDA as the 
producer can voluntarily exit in the presence of the FDA, m￿mo, and that the drug pipeline 
would be more numerous without the FDA as the agency raises R&D costs, N￿No.  Therefore, if 
the drug is valuable, then W(a,m) ￿ W(ao ,mo), and the FDA generates a social cost due to the 
less rapid and potentially barred marketing of the drug and the potential that it is withdrawn for 
undue reasons:  
  C= NE[W|w￿0]-NoEo[W|w￿0]  ￿ 0 . 
This term is negative because when the drug is socially valuable, the welfare falls in the approval 
time and rises in the market time m, so if the agency raises a and reduces m, then it lowers 
welfare. On the other hand, if the drug is socially harmful, then W(a,m) ￿ W(ao ,mo) and the FDA 
confers a benefit by delaying or barring marketing of the drug or getting it off the market faster; 
hence 
B=NE[W|w<0]-NoEo[W|w<0] ￿ 0 . 
This term represents the gain in welfare due to increased safety from keeping unsafe drugs off 
the market and, when approved, speeding up their withdrawal.  This term is positive because     11 
when the drug is unsafe, welfare rises in the approval time a and falls in the market time m so 
that if the agency raises the approval time and lowers the market time, social welfare rises.  
The overall welfare effect depends on the benefits of more quickly eliminating or 
removing unsafe drugs versus the costs of reduced speed of market entry of safe and efficacious 
drugs, i.e.,   
  A-Ao= Pr{w<0}B + Pr{w￿0}C. 
The agency thus has two opposing effects; one harmful (speed effect for valuable products) and 
one beneficial (more speedy elimination effects for unsafe products). These two components of 
aggregate welfare comprise the essential speed vs safety tradeoff of the FDA analyzed in this 
paper.  The effects are exemplified by changes in behaviors surrounding PDUFA which may be 
interpreted as moving away from A towards Ao through speeding up approval but potentially 
increasing safety issues.  Note that the speed element central to the FDA makes the two 
components of welfare depend on elements of the distribution F in addition to the classic type I 
and II errors represented by the share of bad drugs approved, Pr{a<￿|w <0}, and the share of 
good drugs not approved,  Pr{a=￿|w>0}.  Rather, it is the timing of the decisions made that 
matters and that needs to be explicitly incorporated into any methodology evaluating agency 
approval behavior.    
Our empirical analysis will estimate the impact of PDUFA on the aggregate welfare A.  
In particular, we will estimate the first term in the change from A towards Ao induced by 
PDUFA, the value of the greater speed induced by the legislative acts.  Thereafter we compute 
the equivalent loss in health, in terms of life years lost, that any offsetting increase in the second 
term, due to a lowered safety of the approval process, must have to offset the benefits of this 
increased speed.  In doing so, we will estimate the impact of PDUFA on the distribution of     12 
approval times F(a), the distribution of market times F(m), and use these with estimates of the  
producer and consumer surplus distribution F(￿,s) to calculate the induced change in aggregate 
social surplus A. 
 
 
III.   ESTIMATING THE BENEFITS OF SPEED DUE TO PDUFA  
A.   Background on PDUFA
4  
  The concept of payment of user fees by individuals or firms being provided services by a 
government regulatory body has ample precedent, e.g., application submission fees to the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office.  The development of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act permitted 
the FDA to collect fees from sponsors submitting a New Drug Application (NDA or Biologics 
License Application (BLA) for review.  The passage of PDUFA-I in 1992 was, however, 
somewhat controversial in that the amount of fees collected for each sponsor application was 
very substantial, unlike that for patent applications.  In the initial fiscal year 1993 user fee 
schedule, applications with clinical data were assessed a one-time fee of $100,000; each 
supplemental application with clinical data, and applications with no clinical data, $50,000; 
annual manufacturing establishment fees were $36,080, and annual product fees were $6,000.  
With effective renewals of PDUFA-I in 1997 under the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 
1997 (“PDUFA-II”) and the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (“PDUFA-
III”), fees have escalated sharply.  In fiscal year 2004, for example, applications with clinical 
data were assessed a one-time fee of $573,500; each supplemental application with clinical data, 
and applications with no clinical data, were assessed a user fee of $286,750; annual 
manufacturing establishment fees were $226,800, and annual product fees were $6,000.  Waivers     13 
and exemptions were granted to small firms, and to sponsors submitting an application under the 
Orphan Drug Act of 1983.
5 
  In exchange for the collected user fees, the FDA was legally obliged to “review and act 
on” NDA/BLA submissions.  However, similar to the journal referee process in the academic 
environment, reviewing and acting on is not the same as reaching a final approval decision.   
According to the PDUFA-III legislation, for example:  
“ ’review and act on’ is understood to mean the issuance of a complete action letter after 
the complete review of a filed complete application.  The action letter, if it is not an 
approval, will set forth in detail the specific deficiencies and, where appropriate, the 
actions necessary to place the application in condition for approval.”
6 
In essence, therefore, PDUFA mandates responses and action letters from the FDA, but not 
necessarily approvals or final denials. 
  NDA/BLA submissions are assigned either a “standard” or “priority” status, depending in 
part on the novelty of the therapeutic and the existence of unmet needs.  In the case of PDUFA-I, 
II and III, the FDA is required to deliver a “complete review” on 90% of priority applications 
within six months.  For standard applications, the FDA was obliged to review 90% of 
applications in twelve months under PDUFA-I; currently, the FDA is mandated to review 90% 
of standard applications within ten months.   
On the action date mandated by PDUFA, the FDA issues one of three possible actions.  
The first is a non-approvable letter indicating that the NDA/BLA has not satisfied the FDA’s 
standards for safety and/or efficacy.  The second is an “approvable” letter that indicates the 
NDA/BLA can be approved if certain deficiencies and questions are appropriately acted upon by 
the sponsor.  The third type of action is the ultimate approval letter that gives the sponsor     14 
company the right to market the drug to the public.  Although PDUFA action date mandates have 
generally been met by the FDA, these action dates are not the same as approval dates.      
To assess the impact of PDUFA on approval times, we considered drug approval data 
provided to us by the FDA.  These data indicate that approval times have been falling for quite 
some time, at least since 1979, and appear to suggest that approval time declines have 
accelerated, particularly during PDUFA-I.  For example, mean approval time during 1979-86 
was 33.6 months, 28.2 months in 1987-92, 18.6 months during PDUFA-I, and 16.1 months 
during PDUFA-II.  Since the approval time data is skewed to the right, the corresponding median 
approval times are all smaller, but they too fall over time: 27.1 (1979-86), 23.8 (1987-92), 16.2 
(PDUFA-I), and 12.3 (PDUFA-II).   
One way of depicting drug approval time trends is to construct “survival” curves that plot 
the proportion of approvals not yet completed within a fixed time period.  More precisely, the 
“survival” curve in Figure 2 plots the percent approvals remaining over time in months, one 
curve for each of the time periods 1979-86, 1987-92, PDUFA-I and PDUFA-II.   
Survival curves from more recent time periods are clearly separate from and ever closer 
to the origin than are those from earlier eras.  The more rapid decline in survival curves during 
PDUFA-I and II relative to the pre-PDUFA time period indicates faster approvals.  Note that the 
horizontal line designated with a 90% rate in the graph intersects the various survival curves at 
far longer time periods than those stated by the PDUFA goals, since the PDUFA goals involved 
review times rather than approval times. 
B.   Estimating The Effects of PDUFA on The Approval Time Distribution F(a) 
To estimate the incremental impact of PDUFA on approval times empirically, we used 
data on 662 NMEs, small molecule chemicals and biological agents, submitted to the FDA for     15 
review on a government fiscal year basis between October 1, 1979 and September 30, 2002. 
Initially we report here the main results contained in Berndt et al [2005]
7, where we only 
assessed the effects on review times and thus did not propose and perform the economic 
evaluation discussed here.    
We estimated parameters in multivariate regression specifications in which the dependent 
variable was the natural logarithm of the time between NDA/BLA submission and final FDA 
approval.  An annual time trend counter variable (1979=1, 2002=23) was included as a regressor, 
as were 0-1 PDUFA-I and PDUFA-II indicator variables, the latter two interacted with another 
time trend counter (1992/1993=1, 2001/2002 = 10).   
Several additional explanatory variables were added to account for potentially 
confounding non-PDUFA effects (e.g., efforts by oncology and HIV/AIDS patient advocacy 
groups). These variables included binary (0-1) variables for whether the application was 
submitted under the Orphan Drug Act provisions, whether the application was designated a 
Priority Review status, and whether the sponsor was domestic versus foreign.  To account for 
differential clinical difficulties in the development process, the time in clinical development 
(natural logarithm of time between the Initial New Drug Application (IND) and the NDA/BLA 
submission) was added as a regressor, as were 0-1 indicator variables for twelve therapeutic 
classes (cardiovascular, anti-infective, anti-neoplastic, CNS, AIDS, metabolic/endocrine, 
gastrointestinal, dermatology/ophthalmology, anti-inflammatory, radiopharmaceuticals, 
respiratory and other, with biologics being the omitted reference case).  To allow for therapeutic 
class-specific time trends, each of the twelve therapeutic class indicator variables was interacted 
with the PDUFA-I and PDUFA-II time trend interaction variables.  Analysis revealed that only 
in two therapeutic areas (anti-inflammatory and anti-neoplastic) were PDUFA-related time     16 
trends different from the overall trends.  Regression results with and without the differential anti-
inflammatory and anti-neoplastic PDUFA-related trends are given in Table 1. 
In the specification assuming equal time trends across therapeutic classes (first column of 
Table 1), the parameter estimate on the overall time trend suggests an annual decline of about 
1.7% in approval times; the negative coefficients on the PDUFA-I and II variables imply that this 
decline accelerated to about 9-10% annually during PDUFA-I, and then declined at a slightly 
slower rate of about 5% during PDUFA-II.  When differential therapeutic class PDUFA-related 
time trends are permitted (the second set of columns in Table 1), the pre-PDUFA and post-
PDUFA annual declines for most therapeutic classes remain the same as in the more restricted 
specification.  However, during PDUFA-II, the annual declines in approval time for anti-
inflammatory drugs approach 15%, while those for anti-neoplastic agents reach about 10%.  In 
both specifications, as expected, the regression analysis revealed shorter approval times for 
priority vs. standard review (-0.490 exponentiated, about 38%). 
In terms of therapeutic class effects, since the regression coefficients are relative to the 
biologics class, controlling for other confounding variables, approval times were shortest for 
AIDS applications (about 56% shorter than biologics), about 30% shorter for the “other” class, 
and about 25% shorter for applications in the anti-infective and anti-neoplastic therapeutic 
classes; each of these was statistically significantly shorter than that for biologics (p-values < 
0.05).  The only class for which approval times were significantly longer than biologics both pre- 
and post-PDUFA was that for respiratory agents (about 33% longer). 
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IV.  THE EFFECT OF PDUFA ON PRODUCER SURPLUS 
We now report results from estimating the effects of PDUFA on the total producer 
surplus ￿￿dF, which represents the innovative return of the drug after R&D has been undertaken.  
PDUFA affects an innovator’s returns by raising both the costs and the benefits of innovation.  
The cost is raised by the amount of the use fee taxes levied, while the benefit is raised by the 
gains in the present value of the innovator’s return induced by the more rapid FDA approval.   
The effect of faster approval on producer surplus is the difference between the surplus 
under the observed approval time and the counterfactual approval time for that drug with 
PDUFA interaction variables set to zero in the estimated approval time multivariate regression 
specifications discussed in the previous section.  A similar set of calculations can be undertaken 
to compute the present value of the additional user fee costs associated with PDUFA for a given 
drug.  The net gain in the present value of an innovative return is then computed by netting out 
the user fees from the gains due to faster approvals since the inception of PDUFA, all in present 
values.   
To implement these calculations empirically, several estimation issues must be resolved 
regarding the discount rate, the estimation of sales profiles and the estimation of drug specific 
taxes or user fees.  First, we implement the innovative return calculations using a range of real 
discount rates from 3 to 9 percent.
8   
Second, data are needed on actual and predicted sales of drugs over their life cycle, as 
well as actual and predicted PDUFA user fees.  Through a third party agreement with IMS 
Health Inc., the FDA provided us comprehensive retail plus hospital sales data for all drugs on 
the U.S. market from February 1998 through December 2002.  The sales data included the 
following channels: independent pharmacies, chain pharmacies, mass merchandisers with and     18 
without pharmacies, mail order pharmacies, food stores with pharmacies, non-federal hospitals, 
federal facilities, clinics, long-term care facilities, home health care, closed HMOs, and 
miscellaneous channels (starting in 1999, prisons, universities and other).
9  Given that many 
drugs were approved prior to 1998 and that data on future sales beyond 2002 were unavailable, 
estimates of sales outside years 1998 through 2002 were needed.   IMS Health has reported 
results of an analysis of launch to peak sales for new chemical entities, based on 816 new 
chemical entities launched since 1983 (information on the terminal year is not available).
10  
Results from this analysis relate over a 15-year life cycle the average yearly sales as a percent of 
peak sales.  Although the IMS analysis found that a drug on average reached its peak sales 13 
years after launch, sales in years 10 through 13 are relatively flat, and then drop off 
precipitously.
11  Based on the IMS data and analysis, for each drug, sales were first annualized if 
the available sales data did not begin in January of a given year.
12   Predicted peak sales for that 
drug were then computed using the IMS life cycle year to peak percentages, as were sales for all 
other years not observed in the IMS data.  All sales were then deflated to 1992 dollars using the 
GDP deflator. 
  Third, incremental costs associated with PDUFA include calculations of the present value 
of PDUFA user fees.  PDUFA fees consist of application fees, establishment fees, and product 
fees; as noted earlier, these have risen sharply since 1992.  PDUFA fees for 2005 and forward 
were estimated based on the compound annual growth rates (CAGR) observed from 1993 to 
2004.  Given that the US Congress has renewed PDUFA in 1997 and 2002, and given that the 
renewal year has generated a much larger percentage increase in the user fee schedule than the 
relatively minor subsequent increases within PDUFA-I, PDUFA-II, and PDUFA-III, we 
forecasted significant increases for 2008 and 2013, the next times PDUFA will likely need to be     19 
reauthorized.  Specifically, we constructed large percentage increases in reauthorization years 
and subsequent minor increases between reauthorizations so as to yield a CAGR in real user fees 
of 15%, approximately equal to that observed historically.  Similar to the sales curves, the actual 
PDUFA fees were deflated to 1992 dollars using the GDP deflator. 
  Novel NDA/BLA application fees were charged during the year of an NDA/BLA 
submission to the FDA.  Product fees and establishment fees were allocated during each year of 
sales.  We allocated 100% of the establishment fee to each NME.  This likely overstates such 
fees, since many establishments manufacture more than one drug or biologic; informal 
conversations with the FDA indicated that on average, approximately three drugs/biologics are 
manufactured per location.  This allocation therefore biases upward the user fee cost 
calculations.  It was also necessary to forecast the number of future supplemental applications,  
since detailed information is not yet readily available to us.  From PDUFA performance reports 
of 1997, 1999 and 2003, we noted that between 1993 and 2003, a total of 1,266 original 
NDAs/BLAs were filed at the FDA (not all of which were, of course, approved).  Over the same 
time period, 1,518 efficacy supplements were also filed (of which how many were approved we 
do not know).  The ratio of filed supplements to filed original NDAs/BLAs over this time period 
is 1.199.  Since it is plausible to expect that the proportion of supplemental submissions 
approved by the FDA is larger than the proportion of novel NDA/BLA submissions that is 
approved, we expect the actual number of supplementals approved for each approved NDA/BLA 
to be larger than 1.199.   We therefore make the assumption that for every approved NDA/BLA, 
two supplemental applications are submitted in the second year post market launch.  This is a 
relatively “conservative” assumption in that 2.0 is a large number, and that the timing of both 
supplements being in the second year post launch likely overstates the rapidity with which such     20 
supplementals are filed.
13  These assumptions on supplementals therefore bias upwards the 
present value of the PDUFA supplemental user fees.  Since supplemental NDAs/BLAs do not 
increase the product fee or establishment fee already being paid by a sponsor, no further 
adjustments are made.    
Table 2 reports our principal findings for the effect of PDUFA on producers’ innovative 
returns, based on assumptions regarding the share of variable costs of revenues and the real 
discount rate.  Our estimates of the share of sales that are attributable to costs are from existing 
estimates in the literature.  For example, using generic prices several years after initial generic 
entry as an estimate of marginal costs, and based on data from the 1980s and early to mid-1990s, 
Grabowski and Vernon [1992] and Berndt, Cockburn, and Griliches [1996] report that in most 
cases the brand price is more than four times the estimated marginal costs.
14  In Table 4 we 
therefore set variable costs equal to 20% of sales revenue, for drugs during patent protection.      
Table 2 indicates that the aggregate gains in producer surplus ranged from $14 billion 
($11 billion with PDUFA and variable costs removed) under a 3% real discount factor to $17 
billion ($13 billion with PDUFA and variable costs removed) under a 9% real discount factor. 
These gains in producer surplus incorporate the additional user fee costs of PDUFA represented 
by an aggregate amount of about $890M in present value in the case of a 3% discount rate and 
$390M under a 9% discount rate.   
 
V.   THE EFFECT OF PDUFA ON SOCIAL SURPLUS 
Next we report results from estimating the effects of PDUFA on the total social surplus 
￿WdF by augmenting the estimated effects of PDUFA on producer surplus ￿￿dF by the estimated 
effects on consumer surplus ￿SdF.  However, as opposed to the producer surplus, the annual     21 
consumer surplus is lower during the patent period, when it is limited by the degree of market 
power by the patent holder, than after the patent has expired, when prices come down and 
consumer surplus rises. Annual consumer and social surplus calculations must therefore 
differentiate between pre- and post patent expiration, whereas this was not a major issue when 
producer surplus was assumed zero after patent expiration. 
  In estimating social surplus, we are interested in how one can use readily available sales 
data in order to provide a bound on the social surplus before and after expiration.  Regardless of 
the form of the inverse demand and variable cost functions, sales bound social surplus from 
below when   
    ￿ + s ￿ py.                                                       
Substituting in for ￿(y) and rearranging yields 
    s ￿ c, 
i.e., consumers’ surplus is at least as large as variable costs.  This holds because sales understate 
social surplus by the amount of consumer surplus, and overstate social surplus by the costs of 
production.  Sales always overstate producer surplus, but understate social surplus if variable 
costs are small and there is some consumer surplus.   
  The degree to which sales captures the social surplus depends on the extent of market 
power.  Let f be the fraction of social surplus captured by the producer as defined by 
    f=f[￿ + s]. 
Under perfect competition the fraction f attains its minimum value of zero and the consumers 
capture the entire surplus. At the opposite extreme, when producers have sufficient market power 
to perfectly price discriminate, this share attains its maximum value of unity.  Given the extent to     22 
which producers capture social surplus, we can rewrite the condition when sales bound social 
surplus according to 
  (1/f)￿ ￿ py,                                                            
which when rewritten becomes   
  p/[c/y] ￿ 1/(1-f). 
This states that if the average markup is above a threshold level, sales provide a lower bound on 
surplus.  A special case, potentially applicable to pharmaceuticals when sales perfectly measure 
social surplus, is when the producer captures the entire surplus through perfect price 
discrimination and variable costs are ignorable; 1-f=s=c=0.    
  To illustrate, consider the often estimated constant returns case with a linear demand 
function, as in p(y) = a – by and c(y) = cy.  In this case, regardless of (a,b,c), the fraction of 
surplus captured by the producer is f=2/3, so that sales bound social surplus from below 
whenever the variable cost to price ratio is less than a third : c/p < 1/3. This follows from the 
result that in this case the monopoly output is half the competitive output, which implies that 
consumer surplus is half the profits.   
Using these bounding methods to identify consumer and social surplus from sales data, 
we report in  Table 3 our principal findings on the estimated effects of PDUFA on these 
quantities.   
The various rows in Table 3 are calculated in a relatively straightforward fashion.  The 
sales bound for the social surplus before expiration (Row A) is simply the present value of gross 
sales over a 15 year time period under patent protection.  Variable costs and PDUFA fees are not 
subtracted.  In all cases, the counterfactual calculations use our regression specification to predict 
the delay in approval time, which increases the number of years the 15-year sales curve is     23 
discounted.  The sales bound on social surplus after patent expiration (Row B) is calculated as a 
15-year decreasing annuity with the initial payment being the average of the last three years of 
sales for each product while on patent.  This annual payment then decreases by 10% per annum 
and is discounted back to 1992.  The calculations are done on a drug by drug basis and then 
aggregated. 
We next calculate cases for the highest consumer surplus (corresponding to a linear 
demand curve and constant returns) and lowest consumer surplus (producer captures entire social 
surplus during time of patent protection).  The highest case before patent expiration (Row C) is 
calculated as 50% of the net sales that are shown in Table 2 for both PDUFA and the 
counterfactual scenario.  For the case after patent expiration (Row D), we double the post-patent 
expiration social surplus sales bound (Row B).  If we sum the pre- and post-patent expiration 
periods for the highest case, we obtain the total consumer surplus (Row E).  We can then add the 
producer surplus, calculated with PDUFA and variable costs removed in Table 2, to obtain the 
total social surplus in the highest case (Row F).  For the case of the lowest consumer surplus, we 
assume that the consumer does not accrue any benefit prior to patent expiration (Row G = 0).  
After patent expiration, the consumer accrues a surplus equal to the lower bound of the social 
surplus (Row H), which was calculated in Row B.  We can then sum the before- and after-patent 
expiration (Rows G and H) to obtain the total consumer surplus for the lowest case scenario 
(Row I).  To calculate the total social surplus under the lowest case scenario (Row J), we simply 
add the total consumer surplus we calculate here to the producer surplus in Table 2, which is net 
of PDUFA fees and variable costs. 
Table 3 presents our major findings on the consumer and social surplus induced by the 
more rapid drug approvals associated with PDUFA. The first set of estimates measures lower     24 
bounds on social surplus represented by sales when price-cost margins are high on the patent 
together with the last year prior to patent expiration representing the annual surplus after patent 
expiration.  This provides lower bounds on the social surplus during the patent and assumes the 
social surplus is the same after the expiration as during the expiration.  Under a low (high) 
discount rate of 3% (9%), the table indicates that PDUFA I - II raised the estimated lower bound 
on social surplus by $14B or 1.3 % ($17B or 3.7%) before patent expiration and $7B or 1.2% 
($5B or 4%) after patent expiration. 
The second set of estimates assumes a consumer surplus under a linear demand and 
constant marginal costs. In this case, during the patent the consumer surplus is half the producer 
surplus and after patent twice the producer surplus just prior to expiration. Under a low (high) 
discount rate of 3% (9%), Table 3 indicates that PDUFA I and II raised the high estimate of 
consumer surplus, comprised of both prior-and post-expiration levels, by $19Bor 1.2 % ($17B or 
3.8%).  Together with the producer surplus estimates of roughly $11B ($13B) from the previous 
table, this amounts to a total increase in social surplus of $31B or 1.2% ($30B or 3.7%). 
The third set of estimates is the most conservative estimate of the consumer gains, and is 
based on the assumption that there is no consumer surplus while the drug is on patent. Because 
of the extensive market power of the patent-monopolist assumed in these estimates, the 
consumer surplus after the patent expires equals the producer surplus just prior to patent 
expiration. This represents a worst case scenario for consumers.  Under a low (high) discount 
rate of 3% (9%), Table 3 indicates that PDUFA I and II raised the estimated consumer surplus by 
$7 billion or 1.2 % ($5 billion or 4%) in this case.  Therefore, even in this conservative case, 
there are substantial gains to consumers from the more rapid FDA approval of drugs during 
PDUFA I and II .     25 
VI.  ESTIMATING THE SAFETY EFFECTS OF PDUFA  
The previous discussion reports findings from estimating the first term or speed 
component of the change in aggregate welfare A towards Ao induced by the changes of PDUFA. 
In this section we discuss the second term representing any offsetting changes in safety that may 
have occurred.  We also attempt to price out these safety deteriorations in terms of health effects. 
A.    Estimating The Effects of PDUFA on The Market Time Distribution F(m) 
In a previous analysis, we have examined the impact of PDUFA on the market time 
distribution F(m) by considering the time until withdrawal of  drugs pre- and post-PDUFA. 
Specifically, in Berndt et al. [2005] we have reported on various pre- and post-PDUFA 
withdrawal comparisons.
15  Simple proportion comparisons involving the number of NMEs 
withdrawn prior to the passage of PDUFA I relative to the number of NMEs withdrawn during 
PDUFA I and II suggest that no difference exists between the two periods.  However, these 
simple, naïve comparisons do not account for censoring of the data (limited observation time for 
post PDUFA NMEs compared to the pre-PDUFA cohort).  In order more reliably to assess the 
potential difference between the cohort of NMEs with withdrawals prior to PDUFA to the cohort 
of NMEs with withdrawals after PDUFA, we constructed Kaplan-Meier curves (see Figure 3).  
Based on a log-rank test analysis, we concluded that we could not reject the null hypothesis that 
the two curves are identical (p-value of no difference = 0.39).  We note that all comparisons, 
whether simple proportion comparisons or Kaplan-Meier analysis, are heavily reliant on the 
determination of what NMEs belong in the numerator and in the denominator.  More 
specifically, determining the actual distribution of NMEs withdrawn from market and assigning 
them to the appropriate cohort is reliant on three main factors.  First, the definition of when the 
PDUFA legislation actually took effect and which NMEs were reviewed under the PDUFA     26 
guidelines is not definitive.  Discussions with FDA personnel confirm that the legislation was 
passed as of late 1992 but that the actual effects of PDUFA were only affected sometime in 
1993.  The “flexibility” in timing can shift several NMEs (e.g., tamfloxacin, cisapride) between 
the pre-PDUFA and post-PDUFA cohorts.  
  Secondly, as discussed in our 2005 article, the definition of pre-PDUFA is ambiguous as 
well.  For purposes of our analysis, we defined a time period from roughly 1980 forward; 
however, one could easily argue that the pre-PDUDFA period should extend further back in 
time.  Our choice of the initial year of the pre-PDUFA era was made by simple data availability, 
which began in fiscal year 1980.   
Finally, the list of NMEs and withdrawn NMEs may be deemed somewhat arbitrary 
given that there are examples of product withdrawals for lack of use (a.k.a. revenue) that may 
suggest reduced efficacy or intolerable side effects.  These drug withdrawals are not accounted 
for in our analysis.  Other NMEs have been withdrawn, but later reintroduced.     
  While several studies have investigated the withdrawal rate of NMEs (i.e., a Government 
Accountability Office study in 2002, and a 1999 FDA analysis published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association) 
16, the fact that there are relatively few safety withdrawals, pre- 
and post-PDUFA, as compared to the total NMEs approved implies that the statistical power to 
detect significantly different safety withdrawal rates pre- and post-PDUFA is likely rather low.  
Combined with the additional  issues regarding inherent ambiguity in determining the 
numerator/denominator, we recognize that there is room for continued debate and discussion of 
the withdrawal distribution and whether it has changed pre- and post-PDUFA.  Thus we assess 
safety issues by making alternative bounding assumptions..   
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B.   Estimating the Potential Health Effects or Quality of Withdrawal 
Even though we believe there is no convincing evidence of differences in the distribution 
of market times pre-and post PDUFA, representing the quantity of safety withdrawals, there may 
be differences in the quality of drugs that were withdrawn.  More precisely, in such cases the 
producer surplus would still be estimated by observed revenues, but when a drug is withdrawn 
appropriately, there may have been negative consumer surplus levels that more than offset the 
positive producer surplus, making the social surplus negative. Ideally, we would subtract the 
negative social surplus of such withdrawn drugs from the overall gain in surplus attributable to 
their initial more rapid approval.  However, it is very difficult to estimate these negative 
consumer surplus effects of withdrawn drugs as it entails consumers paying for and consuming 
products that are claimed to make them worse off.  Nonetheless, to assess the potential health 
effects of such unwanted consumption, we estimate the magnitude in the reduction in health that 
would eliminate the benefits of more rapid approval of drugs attributable to PDUFA.  In Table 4 
we report results from computing the equivalent amount of life years that must have been lost in 
order for PDUFA to have reduced social welfare.  These estimates are derived from dividing the 
estimates of the benefits of speed (under 3% discounting) by existing estimates of the value of a 
life year, which we assume range between $100,000 and $300,000.      
The estimates in Table 4 indicate how many life years must have been lost on withdrawn 
drugs in order to offset the estimated gains in consumer surplus of non-withdrawn drugs, plus 
producer surplus gains from both withdrawn and non-withdrawn drugs.  Table 4 indicates that 
for the lower bound on the social surplus, there must have been a loss of 70,000 life years when 
estimated at $100K per life year, and 23,333 life years when estimated at $300K per life year. 
Similarly, for the highest surplus estimated, the health loss must have been 310,000 to 103,333     28 
and for the lowest social gains estimated, withdrawn drugs must have caused a loss of 180,000 to 
60,000 life years, depending on whether an additional life year is evaluated at $100K or $300K, 
respectively. 
C.  Estimating an Upper bound on The Adverse Safety effects of PDUFA 
For any estimates of the quality or safety effects of PDUFA one needs counterfactual 
estimates of the approval- and market times (a,m) in the absence of PDUFA for the withdrawn 
drugs observed under PDUFA, analogous to previous sections where we estimated 
counterfactual approval times in absence of PDUFA for non-withdrawn drugs. 
  We consider an extreme case in which all withdrawals after 1992, for drugs submitted for 
review after the passage of PDUFA I, were attributable to PDUFA and where there were no 
benefits associated with the drugs so that their social surplus was measured by the harmful health 
effects the withdrawn drugs imposed.  More precisely, in this extreme case we assume the 
counterfactual approval times in the absence of PDUFA to be infinite, a=￿, and thus 
corresponding to no welfare W(￿,m)=0. The change in welfare is thus 
  W(￿,m)-W(a,m). 
This is a gain (loss) in welfare if the annual welfare w is negative (positive).  In terms of this 
expression, this computation estimates a worst case scenario against PDUFA by estimating the 
highest welfare losses possible induced by PDUFA.  For all the withdrawn drugs discussed here, 
we assume that the counterfactual approval time in absence of PDUFA would be infinite, a=￿ 
(the drugs would never have been approved), implying that regardless of the assumption of the 
counterfactual market time, welfare vanishes, W=0.  In addition, though an FDA induced 
withdrawal may be inefficient in the sense that those benefiting from a drug may outweigh the 
harms imposed, we assume that those benefits are zero for both consumers and producers so that     29 
the value of withdrawal is maximized by minimizing the negative annual value of the flow of 
pre-withdrawal surpluses w.   
   We have calculated the adverse health effects associated with drugs withdrawn from the 
market that were submitted for review under PDUFA I and II using historical data available via 
The Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) (http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/extract.htm for the 
format of the data and limitations) which reports individual reports by drug and year, the age of 
the patient, and the type of adverse events experienced.  Specifically, we investigated the drugs 
listed in Table 5. 
In Table 6 we report the estimated cost in life years and calculated value in dollars of the 
drugs that were withdrawn.  The AERS data were filtered to provide only deaths and 
hospitalizations for the selected drugs.  For each drug, there were events that did not have an 
event date or age of the patient.  An average of patient age and event date was calculated with the 
existing data for each drug and these values were then completed for the events with missing 
information.  In order to calculate life years lost, we first had to establish life expectancies.  Life 
expectancies were calculated for the period of 1990 and 2000 according to the US Census life 
tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics.  For each individual we were able 
to establish a life expectancy that was specific for that individual’s sex, age, and year of event 
(i.e., a 30 year-old male in 1990 has a different life expectancy than a 30 year-old male in 2000).  
In this analysis, we do not account for hospitalizations that did not result in a fatality and instead 
only focus on reported deaths.  After calculating the estimated life years lost for each drug, we 
can estimate the cost by multiplying the life years either by $100,000 or $300,000, and 
discounting as appropriate.      30 
As shown in Table 6, adding up across the universe of withdrawn NMEs since the 
enactment of PDUFA, we find that this extreme upper bound entails around 55,600 life years 
lost.  This upper bound is then compared to the gains in health implicit in the greater speed 
generated by PDUFA, which we estimated at the equivalent of 180,000 to 310,000 life years 
when valued at $100 thousand per life year (see Table 4).  Put differently, monetizing the life-
years lost by $100 thousand per year and discounting these monetized losses to 1992 dollars (at a 
real discount rate of 3%) from the average year of the events leads to a value of $4.4 billion, 
which is about 40 percent of the estimated value of speed at $11 billion (see Table 2).  Note that 
these calculations include Vioxx (rofecoxib) and Bextra( valdecoxib), which were both recently 
withdrawn, and whether any of them will eventually return to the market is as yet unclear.  
Additionally, we include Alosetron in our calculations; this drug has been returned to market 
with a more restrictive label. 
Table 6 also reports the number of non-fatal hospitalizations reported for each drug, 
which in aggregate for all drugs amounts to approximately 16,000. Although the fatalities 
reported from these data seem more likely to be of lower error than hospitalizations, these 
hospitalizations, if valued substantially, could potentially lead to offsets larger than the gains of 
greater speed induced by PDUFA.  However, we stress that these health effects are an extreme 
form of upper bounds on the adverse effects of PDUFA, based on the assumption that the 
withdrawn drugs had no benefits, that all the drugs that were withdrawn would never have been 
approved in the absence of PDUFA, and that all the individuals who died would have had an 
average life expectancy but  for the consumption of the implicated drug.    
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VII.  DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Our analysis is based on a number of assumptions and limitations.  First, our benefit-cost 
and social surplus calculations are aggregated over all drug classes.  Further research might 
fruitfully focus on disaggregating into specific therapeutic areas and “blockbuster” products.   
  Second, we have employed a product life cycle sales profile pattern based on data and 
analysis from IMS Health.  Other life cycle sales profiles, such as that in the rate of return 
calculations by Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi [2002] could be used instead; moreover, their 
framework allows for a more detailed free cash flow analysis that allows the intensity of 
marketing, manufacturing, and other costs to vary over the product life cycle.  Although we have 
interpreted the relationships among social surplus and industry sales within the context of a 
linear demand curve, explicit nonlinear formulations of the demand curve are worthy of further 
examination.   Moreover, though studies exist that indicate fairly little within class substitution 
across drugs, more general substitution patterns would of course allow for social surplus 
calculations that took into account offsets in producer and consumer surplus due to such 
substitution.   
Third, the analysis reported here ends with NDAs/BLAs submitted to the FDA by the end 
of PDUFA-II (September 30, 2002), and approved by the FDA up through May 2004.   It would 
be useful to update the approval data, to ensure that right censoring is not a significant issue.       
Fourth, another limitation of our study is that the sales data used in the benefit 
calculations represent U.S. sales only.  Foreign sales for drugs sold in the US are typically 75% 
to 100% of U.S. sales.  The extent to which accelerated approval in the United States affected 
international approvals and launch dates was not incorporated into our calculations.  If earlier     32 
U.S. approval encouraged more rapid approval abroad, then the NPV social surplus benefit of 
PDUFA would be greater than we have calculated.   
Fifth, to the extent that accelerated FDA approval of NDAs/BLAs resulted in an increase 
in the duration of patent protection prior to patent expiration, it is possible that our calculations 
understate producers’ benefits from PDUFA.  Two considerations suggest that any such impact 
is likely to be rather small.  First, patent expiration typically takes place 12 or so years following 
product launch (“effective patent life”), and thus viewed in present value terms at the beginning 
of PDUFA in 1992, such end of product life benefits are likely to be very small when 
discounted.
17   Second, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the maximum amount of time a drug 
could enjoy market exclusivity was set at 14 years (with possible 6-month extensions for 
sponsors proving efficacy in the pediatric population); precisely how many of the drugs in our 
sample would have run into this exclusivity ceiling is unclear, but the number is likely to be non-
trivial.  To the extent this would occur, accelerated FDA approval would not translate into longer 
effective patent life.   
A final limitation of our study is that we have not undertaken a separate analysis of “fast 
track” provisions that involve rolling submissions to the FDA.  We believe the impact of this 
omission is likely to be relatively minor, for not only is the number of NDAs/BLAs granted fast 
track study in our sample up through 2002 likely to be small, but preliminary analyses by several 
researchers suggests that the differential impact of fast track from priority status on approval 
times is small, and in some cases fast track may even lengthen approval times.
18 
The methodology and framework proposed could be extended to numerous policies 
beyond PDUFA, such as, for example, facilitating more rapid FDA approvals by allowing 
greater use of surrogate markers as endpoints, while simultaneously requiring enhanced post-    33 
approval surveillance and monitoring efforts.   Since the clinical development time between 
filing of the Investigational New Drug application and submission of the NDA/BLA is two to 
four times larger than review time of the NDA/FDA at the FDA, the framework developed here 
might be useful in examining potential costs and benefits of various other policies that could 
affect the critical pathway from pre-clinical discovery through submission of an NDA/BLA.   
More generally, in our judgment much more work is warranted providing more evidence-based 
and quantitative assessment on the many types of FDA policies that affect the US and other 
populations.    
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1:  Producer and Consumer Surplus for a given Review and Market Time 
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Figure 2:  Survival Curve for NMEs pre and post PDUFA 
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Table 1:  Estimated Effects of PDUFA-I and PDUFA-II on Approval Times 
 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
Intercept Constant 3.515 < 0.001 3.524 < 0.001
Natural Log IND to NDA time -0.001 0.965 -0.012 0.695
Time Trend -0.017 0.038 -0.016 0.050
Priority Review -0.490 < 0.001 -0.487 < 0.001
PDUFA I Time Trend -0.081 0.001 -0.080 0.001
PDUFA II Time Trend -0.037 0.018 -0.029 0.062
IND to NDA Data Missing 0.103 0.521 0.055 0.728
Orphan Drug 0.109 0.094 0.114 0.078
Domestic Company Sponsor -0.072 0.115 -0.074 0.100
Cardiovascular 0.120 0.203 0.136 0.144
Anti-Infectives -0.306 0.001 -0.294 0.002
Anti-Neoplastics -0.304 0.009 -0.143 0.276
CNS 0.128 0.211 0.143 0.159
AIDS -0.812 < 0.001 -0.805 < 0.001
Metabolic/Endocrine -0.062 0.514 -0.056 0.550
Gastrointestinal -0.088 0.516 -0.069 0.607
Dermatology/Opthalomology -0.188 0.087 -0.179 0.101
Anti-Inflammatories 0.101 0.505 0.322 0.061
Radiopharmaceuticals 0.183 0.122 0.202 0.085
Respiratory 0.288 0.041 0.309 0.027
Other -0.352 0.019 -0.334 0.025
Anti-Inflammatory PDUFA II Time Trend N/A N/A -0.114 0.007
Anti-Neoplastic PDUFA II Time Trend N/A N/A -0.064 0.011
R-squared 0.393 R-squared 0.405
Observations 662 Observations 662
Aggregate Specification
for PDUFA Time Trends
Drug Class Specification 









factual Difference % Diff PDUFA
Counter
factual Difference % Diff
Sales 1,149 $  1,134 $   14 $             1.3% 482 $     465 $      17 $             3.7%
PDUFA Costs 0.89 $    - $       0.89 $          N/A 0.39 $    - $       0.39 $          N/A
Variable Costs 230 $     227 $      3 $               1.3% 96 $       93 $        3 $               3.7%
Net 918 $     907 $      11 $             1.2% 385 $     372 $      13 $             3.6%
b b b b  = 1 / 1.09 b b b b  = 1 / 1.03
 
 









factual Difference % Diff. PDUFA
Counter
factual Difference % Diff.
Sales Bound on Social Surplus
A Before Expiration 1,149 $  1,134 $   14 $             1.3% 482 $     465 $      17 $             3.7%
B After Expiration 579 $     572 $      7 $               1.2% 130 $     125 $      5 $               4.0%
Highest Consumer Surplus Case
C Before Expiration 459 $     454 $      5 $               1.2% 192 $     186 $      7 $               3.6%
D After Expiration 1,158 $  1,144 $   14 $             1.2% 260 $     250 $      10 $             4.0%
E Total Consumer Surplus 1,617 $  1,598 $   19 $             1.2% 452 $     436 $      17 $             3.8%
F Total Social Surplus 2,536 $  2,505 $   31 $             1.2% 838 $     808 $      30 $             3.7%
Lowest Consumer Surplus Case
G Before Expiration - $      - $       - $           0.0% - $     - $       - $           0.0%
H After Expiration 579 $     572 $      7 $               1.2% 130 $     125 $      5 $               4.0%
I Total Consumer Surplus 579 $     572 $      7 $               1.2% 130 $     125 $      5 $               4.0%
J Total Social Surplus 1,497 $  1,479 $   18 $             1.2% 515 $     497 $      18 $             3.7%




Table 4:  Estimate of Life Years Impacted to Offset Benefits of PDUFA I and PDUFA II 
PDUFA Benefit 
$ Billions
Life Years Valued 
at $100K
Life Years Valued 
at $300K
Social Surplus Lower Bound $7 70,000                     23,333                    
Social Surplus High Consumer Surplus $31 310,000                   103,333                  
Social Surplus Low Consumer Surplus $18 180,000                   60,000                      
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Table 5:  List of NMEs submitted during PDUFA I/II that were subsequently withdrawn 
for safety reasons 
Drug Name NDA Submission Date Year Approved Year Withdrawn
Bromfenac Dec 30, 1994 1997 1998
Cerivastatin Jul 26, 1996 1997 2001
Grepafloxin Nov 08, 1996 1997 1999
Mibefradil Mar 11, 1996 1997 1998
Troglitazone Aug 01, 1996 1997 2000
Rapacuronium Jun 25, 1998 1999 2001
Rofecoxib*** Nov 23, 1998 1999 2004
Alosetron** Jun 30, 1999 2000 2000
Valdecoxib*** Jan 16, 2001 2001 2005
* Not considered an NME
** Returned to market in 2002 w/ restrictions
*** Not in CDER's 2004 Report to Nation - added by authors  
 
 
Table 6:  Estimated cost of NMEs withdrawn from market that were submitted for review 













Cost at $100K 
per Life Year ($ 
M) 
Cost at $300K 
per Life Year 
($ M)
Cost at $100K 
per Life Year 
(1992 $ M) 
Cost at $300K 
per Life Year 
(1992 $ M)
Cost at $100K 
per Life Year 
(1992 $ M) 
Cost at $300K 
per Life Year 
(1992 $ M)
Alosetron 685                        46          2000 1,037 104 311 81                    244                   51                      153                 
Bromfenac 257                        77          1998 1,787 179 536                  151                  453                   109                    328                 
Cerivastatin 4,455                     883        2000 14,086 1,409 4,226               1,099               3,297                683                    2,049              
Grepafloxacin 72                          13          1998 228 23 68                    19                    57                     13                      40                   
Mibefradil 665                        129        1998 2,029 203 609                  172                  517                   126                    377                 
Rapacuronium 22                          11          2000 516 52 155                  41                    122                   26                      77                   
Rofecoxib 8,013                     1,349     2001 21,815 2,181 6,544               1,669               5,007                999                    2,998              
Troglitazone 1,444                     688        1998 13,048 1,305 3,914               1,094               3,282                780                    2,341              
Valdecoxib 581                        56          2003 1,056 106 317                  77                    231                   42                      126                 
TOTAL 16,194                   3,252     55,601 5,560 16,680 4,403 13,209 2,830 8,490
b b b b = 1/1.03 b b b b = 1/1.09    39 
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